Administrative electronic notifications: how the ten days for them to be deemed refused are counted
The spread of electronic notifications has made the calculation of time limits a critical element in the relationship between citizens, businesses and the “Administraciones Públicas”, Spain's public authorities. Article 43.2 of the “Ley 39/2015, de 1 de octubre, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas” —Law 39/2015 of 1 October, the Common Administrative Procedure Act— provides that, where electronic notification is compulsory or has been expressly chosen by the party concerned, it is deemed refused once ten calendar days have elapsed from the moment it was made available without its content being accessed. The judgment of the Third Chamber of the “Tribunal Supremo”, Spain's Supreme Court, of 12 June 2026, in line with the Chamber's official report for the 2025–2026 biennium, clarifies for the first time that those ten calendar days run from the day after the notification is made available to the party concerned on the “sede electrónica”, the authority's electronic portal, or at the “dirección electrónica habilitada única”, the single authorised electronic address. Once the period has elapsed without access, the notification is deemed refused and the time limits for appeal begin to run. The decision has direct consequences for businesses, professionals and citizens required to deal with the authorities by electronic means and underlines the importance of checking electronic mailboxes regularly.
1.The general regime for electronic notifications under Law 39/2015
The general framework for administrative notifications is set out in articles 40 to 43 of Law 39/2015. Article 40 governs the obligation to notify decisions and administrative acts to the parties whose rights and interests are affected; it requires the notification to be issued within ten days of the date on which the act was adopted and to contain the full text of the decision, stating whether or not it brings the administrative stage to an end, the appeals available, the body before which they are to be lodged and the time limit for lodging them. Paragraph 4 introduces a significant provision: solely for the purpose of treating the duty to notify within the maximum duration of the proceedings as fulfilled, a notification containing the full text of the decision will suffice, as will a duly evidenced attempt at notification.
Article 41 lays down the general conditions for effecting notifications. Paragraph 1 provides that notifications are to be effected preferably by electronic means and, in any event, where the party concerned is required to receive them in that way. It nevertheless allows notification on paper in certain cases, such as where the party concerned attends a registry assistance office of their own motion or where it proves necessary to effect notification by direct delivery by a public employee. It requires that, whatever the means used, notifications make it possible to record their dispatch or being made available, their receipt or access, the dates and times of each, the full content and the reliable identity of sender and addressee, the evidence of all this being placed on the case file. Paragraph 6 adds that, whether the notification is made on paper or by electronic means, the authorities are to send an alert to the electronic device or e-mail address notified by the party concerned, informing them that a notification has been made available on the electronic portal or at the single authorised electronic address, although the absence of such an alert does not affect the validity of the notification.
Article 43 deals with effecting notifications by electronic means. Paragraph 1 defines electronic notification as attendance at the electronic portal of the authority or body concerned, through the single authorised electronic address, or through both systems, as each authority or body may provide. For the purposes of that article, attendance means access to the content of the notification by the party concerned or by their duly identified representative. Paragraph 2 provides that notifications by electronic means are to be treated as effected at the moment access to their content takes place, and adds the key rule: where notification by electronic means is compulsory, or has been expressly chosen by the party concerned, it is deemed refused once ten calendar days have elapsed from the moment the notification was made available without its content being accessed. Paragraph 3 makes it clear that the duty to notify is fulfilled by making the notification available on the electronic portal or at the single authorised electronic address, and paragraph 4 allows notifications to be accessed from the “Punto de Acceso General electrónico”, the government's general electronic access point.
2.Calculating time limits: the reference to article 30 of Law 39/2015
The question of interpretation resolved by the judgment of 12 June 2026 is how those ten calendar days from the “puesta a disposición” (the making available) of the notification are to be counted. Article 30 of Law 39/2015 contains the general rules on calculating time limits. Paragraph 2 provides that, where time limits are set in days, those days are taken to be working days, Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays being excluded from the calculation, unless a statute or European Union law expresses them as calendar days, in which case that fact is to be stated in the relevant notifications. Paragraph 3 provides that time limits expressed in days are to be counted from the day after that on which notification or publication of the act in question takes place, or from the day after that on which a claim is upheld or rejected by administrative silence. Paragraph 5 adds that, where the last day of the period is a non-working day, the period is extended to the following working day.
In the case of article 43.2, the statute itself qualifies the ten-day period as “naturales” (calendar days), which means that every day counts, Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays included, with no exceptions. The doubt was whether time should start running on the very day the notification was made available or on the following day, and whether the general rule in article 30.3 applied. The judgment of 12 June 2026 answers that question in the affirmative: the period of ten calendar days begins on the day after that on which the notification is made available to the party concerned on the electronic portal or at the single authorised electronic address. The Chamber applies the general rule in article 30.3, taking the view that the “puesta a disposición” (the making available) is the functional equivalent of the “notificación” (the notification) for the purposes of the calculation, and that there is no reason to exclude this situation from the rule that time starts on the following day.
3.Consequences of deemed refusal: the start of the time limits for appeal
The Supreme Court's interpretation has direct consequences for when the time limits for appeal start to run. Article 43.2 provides that, once ten calendar days have elapsed from the moment the notification was made available without its content being accessed, the notification is deemed refused. That deemed refusal has the same effects as a notification actually effected: the act is treated as notified and the time limits for bringing administrative appeals or judicial review claims, the Spanish “recursos contencioso‑administrativos”, begin to run. Article 40.2 requires the notification to state the appeals available, the body before which they are to be lodged and the time limit for lodging them. In practice, the electronic notification made available on the portal or at the single authorised electronic address includes that information, so that, once the ten calendar days from the moment it was made available have elapsed without access, the party concerned is in the same position as if they had accessed it on the first day: the act has been notified and the time limits for appeal have started to run.
The rule in article 30.3, as applied by the Supreme Court, means that the first day of the ten calendar days is the day after the notification was made available. If, for example, the notification is made available on 1 July, the period of ten calendar days begins on 2 July and ends on 11 July. If the party concerned does not access the content before 23:59 on 11 July, the notification is deemed refused and the act is treated as notified on 11 July. The time limits for appeal are in turn counted from the following day, in accordance with article 30.3. If the “recurso de reposición”, the application for review by the authority that made the decision, carries a time limit of one month, that period will begin on 12 July and end on 12 August, subject to the general rules on working and non-working days.
4.The obligation to deal with the authorities electronically and the duty to monitor mailboxes
The importance of this case law is heightened by the breadth of the obligation to deal with the authorities electronically. Article 14 of Law 39/2015 provides that the following are in all cases required to deal with the public authorities by electronic means when taking any step in administrative proceedings: legal persons; entities without legal personality; those carrying on a professional activity for which membership of a professional body is compulsory, as regards the steps and dealings they have with the authorities in the exercise of that activity; the representatives of a party who is itself required to deal with the authorities electronically; and public employees, for the steps they take by reason of their position. In addition, the authorities may provide by regulation that notifications are to be effected electronically in particular proceedings and for particular groups of individuals who, by reason of their economic, technical or professional capacity, have access to and the availability of the necessary electronic means.
For those under this obligation, electronic notification is not an option but the rule. Making the notification available on the electronic portal or at the single authorised electronic address triggers the ten calendar days under article 43.2, and deemed refusal for want of access produces notification. The Supreme Court's case law reinforces the idea that the duty of diligence includes checking electronic mailboxes regularly. It is not enough to rely on the e-mail or SMS alerts sent by the authorities under article 41.6; those alerts are not constitutive and their absence does not affect the validity of the notification. Businesses, professionals and citizens under that obligation should build periodic review of the electronic portal and of the single authorised electronic address into their compliance systems, so as to prevent significant acts from being treated as notified without actual knowledge of them.
5.The relationship with the duty to decide and with limitation
The rules on electronic notification also connect with the duty to decide and with the limitation of rights and obligations. Article 21 of Law 39/2015 imposes on the authorities the duty to adopt an express decision and to notify it in all proceedings, however they may have been commenced, and sets maximum periods for deciding, as a general rule three months where no other period is laid down. Compliance with that duty is verified, in part, through evidence that the notification was made available on the electronic portal or at the single authorised electronic address, in accordance with article 43.3. For the purpose of treating the duty to notify within the maximum duration of the proceedings as fulfilled, it is enough that the notification was made available and that an attempt at notification was duly evidenced, in accordance with article 40.4.
In tax matters, article 67.1 of the “Ley General Tributaria”, Spain's General Tax Act, provides that the limitation period for the authorities' right to determine a tax debt by way of assessment starts to run on the day after that on which the period laid down by regulation for filing the corresponding return or self-assessment expires. Recent case law of the Third Chamber, such as the judgments of 30 January and 2 February 2026 on the “Impuesto sobre Sucesiones” —Spain's inheritance tax— and holographic wills, has insisted that the existence of non-contentious proceedings does not suspend that period. In the context of electronic notifications, the making available of a notification and its deemed refusal may be relevant in determining when the time limits for appeal begin and, where applicable, when limitation begins to run on the right to appeal or to enforce administrative acts.
6.Conclusion: clarity in the calculation and a requirement of electronic diligence
The judgment of 12 June 2026 brings much-needed clarity to the calculation of the ten calendar days under article 43.2 of Law 39/2015. In confirming that the period begins on the day after the electronic notification is made available, the Third Chamber aligns that rule with the general regime for calculating time limits in article 30 and forestalls readings that could artificially bring forward or put back the moment of deemed refusal and the start of the time limits for appeal. An electronic notification is treated as effected at the moment its content is accessed; if there is no access within ten calendar days of its being made available, it is deemed refused and the act is treated as notified.
For businesses, professionals and citizens required to deal with the authorities electronically, the consequence is clear: diligence in checking electronic mailboxes becomes a practical obligation as important as filing pleadings or meeting the time limits for appeal. The authorities discharge their duty to notify by making the notification available; the party concerned discharges their duty to defend their position by accessing it in due time and form. In a paperless administration, the management of time limits is no longer decided by the postman but on the electronic portal.
