01.The resolution unifying criteria and its standing
The Board of Judges of the Civil Section of the Barcelona “Tribunal de Instancia”, the first-instance court, met on 29 October 2026, under article 170 of the “Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial”, Spain's Judiciary Act, and article 62.1 of Regulation 1/2000 on the governing bodies of the courts, and adopted seven criteria on the application of Royal Decree‑Law 29/2026 of 6 October, adopting urgent measures to protect the social function of housing and to expand the supply of affordable housing, in force since 8 October 2026. The presiding judge of the “Tribunal de Instancia” signed the resolution on 3 November. It has been referred to the Governing Chamber of the “Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña”, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, for its information, and it was ordered to be communicated to, among others, the president of the “Audiencia Provincial” of Barcelona, the provincial appeal court, the Provincial Public Prosecutor's Office and the Barcelona bar association and association of “procuradores”, the court agents.
A resolution unifying criteria is not a source of law and does not bind judges, who remain subject only to the law and decide each case independently. Nor does it bind the provincial appeal court, which will hear the appeals. Its value lies elsewhere. It announces how, in principle, the Barcelona civil courts are going to apply an emergency provision that has raised doubts since its first day, and it allows the parties to adjust their strategy before bringing or defending a claim. The resolution bears the number (I), which suggests that others will follow.
To assess each criterion, one must start from the text of the provision, which we reproduce in its essentials.
02.The text and structure of article 2 of Royal Decree‑Law 29/2026
Article 2.1 provides:
“From the entry into force of this royal decree-law and until 31 December 2030, for proceedings in which the claimant is any entity, with or without legal personality, engaged in acquiring properties or portfolios of non-performing mortgage loans for a price clearly below their market appraisal value, both for the purpose of circumventing the mechanisms of the social function of housing or maximising their profitability through disproportionate rents, resale prices or their use for non-residential purposes and, in any event, without applying to territorial public bodies and those other public bodies and commercial undertakings or companies belonging to the public sector whose purpose is the development and management of social and affordable housing, and where the defendant is in a situation of vulnerability, whether certified on the basis of a social services report or by application of the criteria of 441.7 of Law 1/2000 of 7 January on Civil Procedure, and has no alternative housing, whether or not the proceedings have previously been suspended on the terms laid down in article 441.5 of Law 1/2000 of 7 January, the court shall suspend the proceedings by order, this provision likewise applying where a judgment, decree or order has already been issued bringing the proceedings to an end or ordering the eviction, provided that the latter has not actually been carried out”.
Article 2.2 applies, until the same date, “only in those cases in which the provisions of article 5.Two do not apply”, to “proceedings in which the claimants are persons other than those provided for in the preceding subsection”. With the same requirements of vulnerability and lack of alternative housing, and provided that “the competent public authority has not offered decent and suitable alternative housing”, the court requests a report from the authority responsible for housing and social services “so that it reports expressly on the resources they have available and they offer them”. If it does not reply or reports that it has none, “the court shall suspend the proceedings until such measures are adopted and suitable alternative housing is guaranteed”. The suspension “shall be reviewed by the court every twelve months” and is lifted when the vulnerability ceases, when suitable and effective alternative housing is made available or the defendant refuses it without justified cause, or when “three years have elapsed since the suspension was ordered”. The public authority bears the compensation of a claimant who is a natural person or a legal person engaged in affordable or social principal-residence letting, which comprises “at most, the contractual rent not received, as well as the costs of unpaid utilities and the legal costs”, without hypothetical loss of profit or non-pecuniary damage. The provision states that neither the suspension nor the compensation releases the defendant from continuing to pay the rent. And the last paragraph of the subsection adds two limits:
“The suspension shall not be granted where the court finds, in view of the circumstances of the case, that the situation of economic or housing vulnerability of the claimant must prevail, unless the claimant is a legal person, or a natural person who qualifies as a large-scale landlord. Nor shall there prevail the situation of economic vulnerability of the defendant where the claimant is a natural person who owns two or fewer dwellings”.
Two very different regimes emerge from this text. That of subsection 1 is defined by the claimant, an entity that buys properties or portfolios of non-performing mortgage loans for a price clearly below their market appraisal value and with a specific purpose, namely to circumvent the social function of housing or to maximise its profitability through disproportionate rents, resale prices or the use of the dwellings for non-residential purposes. Against such an entity, once vulnerability and the lack of alternative housing have been proved, the suspension is direct, with no prior report from the public authorities, no periodic review, no grounds for lifting it, no three-year limit and no compensation. It lasts, in principle, until 31 December 2030. The regime of subsection 2 is residual and subsidiary. It covers all other claimants, yields to the extraordinary reinstatement of the tenancy under article 22.6 of the LEC, depends on the public authorities not offering an alternative, is reviewed every year, lasts at most three years and entitles to compensation a claimant who is a natural person or a legal person engaged in affordable or social principal-residence letting. Determining which of the two subsections the claimant falls under, and in particular proving the purpose required by subsection 1, will often be the real battleground of the application.
03.The first criterion excludes incidental proceedings concerning third-party occupiers
The resolution excludes from article 2 “incidental proceedings concerning third-party occupiers”, because such occupiers do not have “the status of claimant or defendant referred to in article 2”. The resolution does not cite a provision, but it refers to the incidental procedure that the law lays down for occupiers of the property who are neither the judgment debtor nor those who share its use with the judgment debtor, in article 704.2 of the LEC for the delivery of immovable property and, by cross-reference from that article, in article 675 for properties sold at auction. When the property to be delivered is occupied by such persons, the “letrado de la Administración de Justicia”, the court registrar, notifies them of the enforcement so that within ten days they may produce the titles justifying their situation, and the enforcing party may request the eviction of those it considers to be mere de facto occupiers or occupiers without sufficient title.
The criterion is consistent with the wording of the provision, which speaks of “the defendant”. In our view, however, its scope is limited. It does not affect those who have in fact been sued, even if only generically. This is the case of claims to recover possession of a dwelling brought also against its unknown occupiers, which article 441.1 bis allows to be served on whoever is found living there. A person summoned as a defendant may invoke article 2 even if not identified by name in the claim. For the claimant, the practical consequence is that the wider the circle of defendants, the wider the circle of those who may request suspension.
04.The first criterion also excludes mortgage enforcement proceedings, which are governed by Law 1/2013
The resolution also excludes mortgage enforcement proceedings, because they have “their own specific regulation” in Law 1/2013 of 14 May on measures to strengthen the protection of mortgage debtors, debt restructuring and social rent, which the Royal Decree‑Law has not amended, nor has it amended the grounds for suspending those proceedings. It has, however, reworded article 685.2 of the LEC, which requires the claim to state whether the property is the debtor's principal residence and whether the enforcing party is a large-scale landlord, a “gran tenedor”, with a certificate from the “Registro de la Propiedad”, the Land Registry, where it denies being one. And, as we shall see, its articles 1.4 and 1.5 and its first final provision also affect those who buy or enforce these claims.
The protection of the vulnerable mortgage debtor is therefore found in article 1 of Law 1/2013, which regulates its own suspension of evictions and makes it subject to stricter requirements than those of article 2. Under subsection 1, until fifteen years have elapsed from its entry into force, that is, until 15 May 2028, “eviction shall not proceed where, in judicial or out-of-court mortgage enforcement proceedings, there has been awarded to the creditor, or to any other natural or legal person, the principal residence” of persons in a situation of special vulnerability. Those cases are the large family, the single-parent family unit with at least one dependent child, the family unit that includes a minor, one in which a member has a disability of 33 % or more, a situation of dependency or an illness permanently preventing them from working, that of a debtor who is unemployed, one living with relatives up to the third degree who have a disability, are dependent or are seriously ill, one that includes a victim of gender-based violence, and the debtor over 60 years of age.
Falling within one of those cases is not enough. Four economic circumstances must also be present. The family unit's income may not exceed three times the annual “IPREM”, Spain's public income reference index, calculated on fourteen payments, a limit that increases for each dependent child and rises to four or five times in the cases of disability, dependency or serious illness specified by the law. In the preceding four years, the family unit must have suffered a significant change in its economic circumstances, which the law deems to have occurred when the burden of the mortgage payments on family income has increased by a factor of at least 1,5. The mortgage instalment must exceed 50 % of the family unit's net income. And the loan must be secured on the debtor's only owned dwelling and must have been granted to purchase it. During the suspension, a judgment debtor at the threshold of exclusion may request and obtain from an enforcing creditor that has adhered to the Code of Good Practice under Royal Decree‑Law 6/2012 a lease of the dwelling on the terms laid down in that code.
The comparison with article 2 shows what the Board's criterion means. The mortgage debtor does not have the broad vulnerability filter of article 2, but the closed list and the cumulative requirements of Law 1/2013, and their protection ends on 15 May 2028, more than two and a half years before that of the Royal Decree‑Law. The exclusion is striking given that article 2.1 is aimed precisely at entities that buy portfolios of non-performing mortgage loans, whose natural route to recovery is mortgage enforcement. The exclusion, however, extends only to the enforcement proceedings. In our view, if the party to whom the property was awarded subsequently sues whoever continues to occupy the dwelling as an occupier on sufferance, a “precario” claim, those proceedings are among those of article 441.5, and article 2.1 applies to them in full. The Royal Decree‑Law does provide another protection for that scenario, which the resolution does not mention. Article 1.5 suspends until 31 December 2030 any eviction affecting the principal residence of a vulnerable person with no alternative housing where one of the entities of article 1.1, which include these funds and legal persons that are large-scale landlords, acquires it or is awarded it for less than 70 % of its market value under the exceptions in subsections 2.e) or 4 of that article. Those exceptions may only be invoked from the approval and entry into force of the Code of Good Practice and by entities that prove their adherence to and compliance with it, so that, until the code is approved, article 1.5 has no cases to which it can apply.
Outside enforcement, the first final provision has added to Law 5/2019 an article 25 bis that protects the debtor against the assignment of their loan. The debtor may raise against the assignee the same objections and defences as against the original creditor. The assignment of matured mortgage loans of debtors covered by Royal Decree‑Law 6/2012 is prohibited. And if, after the assignment, the debtor proves within six months that they meet the requirements to be covered by it, the assignor must reacquire the loan for the same price. The rule applies to assignments made from the entry into force of the Royal Decree‑Law.
05.The second criterion requires the social services report to certify vulnerability
Article 2 allows two ways of proving vulnerability. It may be “certified on the basis of a social services report” or result from the “application of the criteria of 441.7” of the LEC. The resolution states that the social services report “must contain express certification of such vulnerability” and that, if it does not, vulnerability may be proved by the second route.
We share the criterion. The participle “certified” leaves no room for the judge to infer vulnerability from a report that merely describes the defendant's financial or family situation. But it is worth clarifying what the second route entails. Article 441.7 does not lay down automatic thresholds. It says that the court “may take into account” certain facts, and it requires of the court a “weighted and proportionate assessment of the specific case, taking into account any situations of vulnerability that may also affect the claimant”. Where the report does not certify, therefore, it is the court itself that assesses vulnerability, and the burden of providing the information falls on the defendant, who will have to prove the family unit's income, the rent, the cost of electricity, gas, water and telecommunications, the make-up of the household and the documents proving disability, dependency or status as a victim of violence against women.
Neither route proves the second requirement of article 2, that the defendant “has no alternative housing”. Under subsection 2, the report that the court requests from the public authorities concerns the resources they can offer, not whether the defendant has an alternative of their own. Under both subsections, we consider that it is for the defendant to show that they have none, normally with the same social services report. For the claimant, reviewing the report produced is the first checkpoint. If it does not expressly certify vulnerability, if it says nothing about the lack of an alternative or if it is on record that the defendant has another dwelling, there are grounds for opposing the application.
06.The third criterion opens an appeal against the order granting suspension
The resolution provides that, if the suspension is granted, “an appeal shall lie in all cases, including the case provided for in article 2.2, and without prejudice to the power of review by the Court every twelve months”, and that, if it is refused, “an application for review shall lie”, the “recurso de reposición”. Applications will be dealt with in a separate procedural file.
The Royal Decree‑Law does not say which remedy is available. Under article 455.1 of the LEC, judgments, definitive orders and orders expressly specified by law are open to appeal, and under article 451.2, an application for review lies against non-definitive orders. The order granting suspension does not bring the proceedings to an end, and so, on a formal reading, it would only admit an application for review. The Board opts for a functional interpretation, which finds support in the LEC's own system, since for suspension on account of a preliminary criminal or civil issue it provides for an appeal against the order granting suspension and only an application for review against the order refusing it (articles 41 and 43). A suspension that may last until 31 December 2030, that requires the claimant to be classified under subsection 1 or subsection 2 and that may be sought at any stage of the proceedings is not an incidental matter, and it merits a second instance. We share this solution, which will allow the Barcelona provincial appeal court to settle its case law on the concepts in the provision. But the last word on whether the appeal is admissible lies with the provincial appeal court, which the resolution does not bind. Until it rules, a party that appeals in accordance with the statement of available remedies contained in the order itself should not be prejudiced if the provincial appeal court were to take a different view.
The asymmetry is deliberate and matches that of those provisions. The claimant whose proceedings are suspended has an appeal, and the defendant who is refused suspension, only an application for review. We consider that a refusal does not prevent a fresh application based on subsequent facts, because vulnerability is a situation that can change.
The resolution mentions review every twelve months, which the text provides for only in subsection 2. In subsection 1, the provision provides for neither review nor grounds for lifting. In our view, the suspension under subsection 1 may nonetheless be lifted if any of its preconditions ceases to exist, for example because the defendant is no longer vulnerable or has alternative housing available, since the suspension is only justified while they persist.
07.The fourth criterion accepts social vulnerability alongside economic vulnerability
The resolution declares that the vulnerability referred to in article 2 “includes both economic vulnerability and social vulnerability”, because “where the legislature has intended to refer exclusively to economic vulnerability it has done so expressly”. The argument draws on the Royal Decree‑Law itself. Article 2 speaks of a “situation of vulnerability”, with no adjective. By contrast, article 22.6 of the LEC requires the tenant to be “in a situation of economic vulnerability as provided by law”, and the last paragraph of article 2.2 distinguishes between the “economic or housing” vulnerability of the claimant and the “economic” vulnerability of the defendant. And the LEC itself already distinguished between the two, since article 441.5 speaks of the household's “economic and, where applicable, social” situation of vulnerability.
The resolution does not say what social vulnerability is, but the law does. Under article 441.7, in assessing it the court “may take into account the fact that those occupying the dwelling include dependent persons within the meaning of subsection 2 of article 2 of Law 39/2006 of 14 December on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons, victims of violence against women or minors”. Dependency is, according to that provision, “the permanent state in which persons, owing to difficulties affecting their autonomy, require care and support from one or more other persons or significant assistance to carry out activities of daily living”. Economic vulnerability, on the other hand, is measured by data. The court may take into account that the rent, in possession claims for non-payment, plus utilities exceeds 30 % of the family unit's income and that such income does not reach three times the monthly IPREM, with increases for each dependent child, for persons over 65 or dependent persons, and up to five times the IPREM if a member has a disability of 33 % or more, a situation of dependency or an illness permanently preventing them from working.
In our view, that list is not closed, because the court “may take into account” those facts, which does not exclude others of equivalent weight, such as a serious illness, advanced age without a family network or a situation of exclusion attested by the social services. But a distinction must be drawn. The three statutory cases, dependent persons, victims of violence against women and minors, are the settled core and may be proved before the court itself by way of article 441.7. Outside them, social vulnerability is unlikely to succeed without a social services report expressly certifying it.
The most delicate question is whether social vulnerability is sufficient on its own. The resolution places it on an equal footing with economic vulnerability, and we consider that this is so at the conceptual level. But article 2 also requires that the defendant “has no alternative housing”, and that requirement acts as a filter. A household with minors and with sufficient means to rent another dwelling has an alternative and cannot benefit from the suspension. In practice, social vulnerability will be decisive for households that narrowly exceed the economic thresholds of article 441.7 but which, because of their make-up, cannot obtain other housing.
The criterion has three consequences that the resolution does not spell out. The first concerns the relationship between article 2.2 and the extraordinary reinstatement of the tenancy. Since article 2.2 only applies where article 22.6 does not, and the latter requires economic vulnerability, in possession claims for non-payment an economically vulnerable tenant will go down the route of extraordinary reinstatement, unless the claimant is an entity under article 2.1, whereas a tenant who proves only social vulnerability may request suspension under article 2.2. The second concerns the funds under article 2.1. Against them, social vulnerability, together with the lack of an alternative, is sufficient to suspend the proceedings until 2030.
The third is the most relevant for the small landlord. The last paragraph of article 2.2 provides that there does not prevail “the situation of economic vulnerability of the defendant where the claimant is a natural person who owns two or fewer dwellings”. If, as the Board maintains, the legislature says “economic” when it means only economic, the exclusion does not extend to social vulnerability, so that the owner of one or two dwellings could see the possession claim against a household with minors or dependent persons suspended even though its economic vulnerability does not count. The opposite view can be defended, on the argument that the purpose of the provision is to protect the small landlord and that it makes no sense to protect them against only one of the two vulnerabilities. But the wording and the logic of the resolution itself point to the first reading, and it is advisable to reckon with it. The small landlord is then left with three defences. They may prove their own economic or housing vulnerability, which under the first clause of the same paragraph may make the suspension inappropriate. They may rigorously challenge the certification of social vulnerability and of the lack of an alternative. And, if suspension is ordered, they may require the order to set the compensation payable by the authority responsible for housing, which the provision grants them as a natural person.
08.The fifth criterion limits the transitional regime to the proceedings listed in the law
The second transitional provision states:
“The regime provided for until 31 December 2030 in article 2, and the new regime provided for in article 5.Two shall apply to the enforcement of decisions given in the proceedings referred to in subsection 5 of article 441 of Law 1/2000 of 7 January that are pending at its entry into force, provided that the eviction has not been carried out”.
In the case of article 2, the provision adds, the judgment debtor may request its application “even if the procedure provided for in those subsections has previously been resolved or the maximum period of suspension provided for in subsection 6 of article 441 has expired”, and, once the application has been lodged with the supporting documents, the court registrar “shall provisionally suspend the carrying out of the eviction until the court rules by order”.
The Board interprets the provision restrictively, so that it applies only to the proceedings to which article 441.5 refers, namely those in numbers 1.º, 2.º, 4.º and 7.º of article 250.1 of the LEC, that is, possession claims for non-payment or expiry of the term, claims against occupiers on sufferance, summary protection of possession, including recovery of an occupied dwelling, and the enforcement of registered rights in rem, “without prejudice to the specific route contained in article 5.2 of the RD where economic vulnerability is present”.
We agree, and we believe that the same delimitation holds for article 2 in proceedings commenced after 8 October. Article 2 does not list the proceedings to which it applies, but it refers to the procedure of article 441.5 and to the criteria of article 441.7, which operate only in those four types of proceedings, and its heading speaks of “evictions”. Evictions resulting from ordinary proceedings, such as an action for recovery of ownership, or from an action for division of jointly owned property would therefore fall outside it.
The most immediate practical consequence lies in the second paragraph of the provision. In enforcement proceedings pending on 8 October, it is enough for the judgment debtor to lodge the application with their documents for the court registrar to suspend the eviction provisionally, even if the court had already exhausted the ordinary two- or four-month suspension under article 441.6.
09.The sixth criterion orders pending evictions to be suspended ex officio so that the extraordinary reinstatement of the tenancy can operate
Article 5.Two of the Royal Decree‑Law has added a subsection 6 to article 22 of the LEC, which begins as follows:
“In possession proceedings for non-payment of rent or sums owed under article 250.1.1.º, where it is proved that the tenant is in a situation of economic vulnerability as provided by law, and not applying to the case provided for in article 2.1 of Royal Decree-law 29/2026 […], if the competent public authority does not offer suitable alternative housing, it shall be obliged to reinstate the tenancy by paying the landlord or paying into court all the sums claimed and those that have accrued up to the time of payment or deposit, as well as the legal costs in favour of the claimant”.
The public authority has “a maximum and non-extendable period of two months from notification”, during which the proceedings and, where applicable, the eviction are suspended. If it pays or pays into court, the tenancy is declared reinstated and the contract remains in force. If it does nothing, it “shall automatically be subrogated to the tenant's position as debtor, and there shall be no eviction, the tenancy agreement remaining in force until its expiry for as long as the situation of economic vulnerability persists”. This reinstatement is independent of the ordinary reinstatement under article 22.4, does not count as a previous reinstatement and is available even if the landlord has served a verifiable demand for payment.
For pending proceedings, the second transitional provision requires that, “before the proceedings continue, irrespective of the stage they have reached, the new obligation of extraordinary reinstatement must be complied with”. The Board infers from this that the pending eviction “must be suspended ex officio” where three requirements are met, that the defendant's economic vulnerability has been established by a previous decision, that the claimant does not fall within article 2.1 and that the case is a possession claim for non-payment brought as a “juicio verbal”, the Spanish summary oral procedure.
The criterion seems to us correct. If the provision requires the extraordinary reinstatement to be complied with before continuing, at any stage, the court cannot carry out the eviction when the case file already shows that its preconditions are met. The previous decision will normally be the order that, in the procedure under article 441.6, found economic vulnerability. We consider that a decision that found only social vulnerability is not sufficient, because article 22.6 requires economic vulnerability. If economic vulnerability is not recorded in a previous decision, the tenant will have to request the application of article 22.6 and prove it.
For the landlord, the effect is significant. If the public authority neither pays nor offers an alternative within two months, the landlord's debtor becomes the public authority, the contract remains in force until its expiry for as long as the economic vulnerability lasts and there is no eviction. A prior demand for payment, which prevents ordinary reinstatement, does not prevent this one. If, on the other hand, the public authority offers suitable alternative housing within that period, the provision does not say what happens. In our view, once the suspension is lifted, the proceedings and the eviction must continue, nor is suspension under article 2.2 available, since it requires that the public authority has not offered an alternative.
10.The seventh criterion leaves the Institut Català del Sòl and the Agència de l'Habitatge de Catalunya outside article 2.2
The last criterion declares that article 2.2 does not apply to the Institut Català del Sòl or to the Agència de l'Habitatge de Catalunya. The Board reasons that article 2.2 refers to proceedings in which the claimants are “persons other than those provided for in the preceding subsection”, and that public bodies whose purpose is the development and management of social and affordable housing are already “provided for” in subsection 1, albeit in order to exclude them. It adds that the allocation of housing by these entities is subject to an administrative procedure that cannot be subverted and that the Barcelona provincial appeal court has not regarded them as large-scale landlords.
The literal argument admits the opposite reading. If subsection 1 mentions these bodies precisely to say that it does not apply to them, it could be argued that they are “persons other” than those regulated by subsection 1 and therefore fall under subsection 2. In our view, the strongest argument in favour of the criterion is another, which the Board does not express. The mechanism of article 2.2 consists in asking the public authority responsible for housing to offer an alternative and in charging it with the claimant's compensation, which makes no sense when the claimant is the housing authority itself. For the same reason, the criterion should extend to other public social housing bodies, even though the resolution names only the two Catalan ones. The resolution does not, however, address the extraordinary reinstatement under article 22.6, which excludes only the case of article 2.1, where the landlord bringing a claim for non-payment is one of these bodies.
11.Practical conclusions
For those bringing claims in Barcelona, the resolution makes it advisable to identify from the outset which subsection of article 2 they may fall under and to prepare evidence that they are not one of the entities of subsection 1; to examine the social services report and oppose the application if it does not expressly certify vulnerability or does not prove the lack of alternative housing; to bear in mind that social vulnerability, on its own, can ground the suspension, including against the small landlord; and to appeal against any order granting suspension without basis. If the claimant is a natural person or a legal person engaged in affordable or social principal-residence letting, it should ask for the order to set the compensation and, in possession claims for non-payment, should be aware that the public authority may become subrogated as debtor.
For those who are sued, the essential thing is to obtain a social services report expressly certifying vulnerability and the lack of alternative housing, and at the same time to gather the documentation needed to prove it before the court by way of article 441.7; to rely on social vulnerability where there are minors, dependent persons or victims of violence against women in the household; and, in proceedings pending on 8 October, to request suspension even if the ordinary suspension has already been exhausted; and to keep paying the rent while the suspension lasts, because the provision does not exempt them from doing so. The mortgage debtor, by contrast, must seek protection under Law 1/2013, with its own requirements and its own time limit, which ends on 15 May 2028.
The resolution gives legal practitioners in Barcelona a certainty that the emergency provision does not provide on its own, but it leaves open significant questions, such as the scope of social vulnerability against the small landlord, the admissibility of the appeal or the protection of the mortgage debtor between 2028 and 2030, which will have to be resolved by the Barcelona provincial appeal court and, foreseeably, by further resolutions of the Board.
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